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Comments

How Should Property Be Valued
In a Cram Down?

I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most intriguing topics in bankruptcy law is the valuation
of property in cram down cases, specifically Chapter 13 cases. This
article will first present and discuss the different methods of valuation
employed by the circuit courts before Associates Commercial Corp. v.
Rash (Rash II)' was decided by the Supreme Court and the reasoning
behind these methods. The next section will discuss the opinion in Rash
and the chosen method of valuation in Chapter 13 cram down cases.
The third section will discuss the implications of the decision in Rash.
The Article will conclude with a proposed solution to the problems
presented by the decision.

1. 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
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THE CIRcurr COURTS

A.

Rash I
In 1994 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case that fueled
this debate.2 In March 1989, Rash purchased a Kenworth truck from
Janoe Truck Sales and Service, Inc. ("Janoe"), a dealer of Kenworth
trucks, at a retail price of $73,700 by entering into sales and related
agreements. Rash owned a freight hauling business and intended to use
the truck as part of his business. Pursuant to the loan, the truck was
to serve as collateral for the loan. After the sale, Janoe assigned the lien
to Associates Commercial Corporation ("ACC"), which held a valid lien
on the truck.'
In March 1992, Rash filed a voluntary petition for relief under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 At the time of filing, Rash owed
$41,171.01 on the balance of the truck. Rash then filed a plan invoking
the cram down option of section 1325(a)(5)(B).5 Rash proposed to let
ACC keep its lien on the truck while he provided fifty-eight monthly
payments of $607.79, including nine percent interest, with payment to
begin after confirmation, for a principal total of $28,500 plus interest.
The remainder of ACC's claim would be treated as unsecured and ACC
would receive a pro rata share of all assets remaining after priority and
secured claims were paid.'
ACC filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay alleging that
ACC was fully secured. It subsequently filed a proof of claim in the
amount of $41,171.01. Rash responded by alleging that ACC's secured

2. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash) (Rash 1), 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.
1994), rev'd en bane, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996) (Rash I), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
3. 31 F.3d at 327.
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. 1998).
5. 31 F.3d at 327. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) lists the requirements that a Chapter 13 debtor
must fulfill in order to get the plan confirmed. Specifically, subsection (aX5) deals with the

allowed claims of secured creditors. Under (a)(5), the debtor must satisfy one of three
options pertaining to the treatment of secured creditors. The first is that the secured
creditor could accept the plan as is. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX5)(A). The second is that the
debtor could surrender the liened property directly to the secured creditor. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(aX5)(C). The last option, the so-called "cram down," forces the debtor to state in the
plan that the secured creditor retains his lien after confirmation of the plan and that the
debtor will at least make payments over the life of the plan equalling the present value of
the allowed portion of the secured creditor's claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX5)(B). Determining
what portion of the claim is allowed is the key focus of this Article because this amount
will often force the monthly payments to be higher or lower, and consequently feasible or
unfeasible.
6. 31 F.3d at 327.
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portion of the claim was $28,500 and the remainder was unsecured. At
a hearing held by the bankruptcy court, ACC's expert testified that a
retail value was more indicative of market value, and that the market
value of the truck was $41,000. ACC's expert defined "market value" as
the amount that a single, "average individual off the street" would pay
for the truck or would bid for the truck at a public sale.' Rash's expert
offered that the wholesale value of the truck was more indicative of
"market value" because the difference between wholesale and retail
value represented the "margin between a dealer's costs of marketing,
reconditioning, payment of sales commissions; and a dealer's profit."'
The bankruptcy court adopted the wholesale value proffered by Rash's
expert.9 Rash subsequently filed an amended proof of claim for the
agreed upon wholesale value of the truck- $31,875.10 The bankruptcy
court confirmed Rash's plan for reorganization under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code using the amended proof of claim and the district court
affirmed."
In reviewing which valuation method was proper, the court of appeals
first looked to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for guidance. 2
Section 506(a) provides as follows:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the

value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property
...and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor's interest.., is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation
and of the proposed disposition or use of such property[.]13
The court noted two lines of case law that have emerged as a result of
the two sentences in section 506(a)."4 One line of authority, the
wholesale or foreclosure value approach, read the first sentence as
operative. Under this approach, the court noted, the creditor's interest
is determinative of how the property is to be valued." Because the

7. Id. at 328.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Rash II, 90 F.3d at 1041. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
14. 90 F.3d at 328.
15. Rash 1, 31 F.3d at 328. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mitchell (In re
Mitchell), 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled by Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96

F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
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foreclosing creditor was not a dealer, the foreclosing creditor could not
resell the collateral at retail prices and could only receive the wholesale
value by selling to a retailer.16 The court also noted that under this
wholesale or foreclosure value approach, courts commonly deduct the
costs that would be incurred in executing the resale or foreclosure. 7
Under the other line of authority, the retail or replacement value
approach, the first sentence of section 506(a) only gives guidance as to
what to value. The second sentence of section 506(a) controls how
valuation is to be made. Because the second sentence states that the
creditor's lien must be valued in light of the purpose of the valuation and
the proposed disposition or use of the collateral, a replacement value is
proper."s "'Vhere the debtor proposes to retain and use the collateral,
... the value of the lien is derived from the stream of payments that the
lien secures, rather than the right to foreclose, since no liquidation of the
collateral is contemplated.'"' 9
The court of appeals selected the replacement value model as the
proper method of valuing the secured creditor's claim and reversed the
district court. 20 The court made two arguments explaining its reasoning. First, the court stated that if the first sentence of section 506(a)
tells not only what is to be valued, but also how, then the second
sentence is mere surplusage.2 ' Second, the "estate's interest in the
property" is that of the debtor's use and possession of the vehicle, and
thus the creditor's interest is derived from the debtor's interest.22 If
the debtor does not intend a liquidation, neither can the creditor if his
interest is truly derived from that of the debtor. 8 Such retainment and
use of the collateral is "acknowledging the value of the collateral to be
greater than if liquidated."24
B.

Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Trimble, and Taffi
One of the first major decisions in this area outside of the Fifth Circuit
was Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Institution for
Savings (In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc.).25 This case dealt
with a business debtor who sought to have a creditor's secured claim

16.

31 F.3d at 328.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 329.
Id. See In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
31 F.3d at 329 (quoting Green, 151 B.R. at 504).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 329 (citing In re Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 1995).
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valued at liquidation value even though the debtor proposed to keep the
property. After the bankruptcy court and the district court agreed that
the fair market value or going concern value was the correct method of
valuation, Winthrop appealed."
The First Circuit Court of Appeals first looked to section 506(a) for
guidance. After viewing both sentences of the statute, the court found
that the statute does not require it to choose any particular valuation
method, but instead allows for flexibility.Y The court then looked to
the legislative history and found that courts are to "'determine value on
a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the
competing interests in the case.' 28 Finally, after reviewing both lines
of authority for the proper valuation method, fair market or going
concern value versus liquidation value, the court held that when a
debtor proposes in its plan to retain control of the property and continue
using it to generate an income stream, the proper measure of value is
fair market value.' In arriving at this holding, the court specifically
mentioned that a per se liquidation value would render the second
sentence of section 506(a) virtually meaningless.' Further, a reorganizing debtor would be able to "reap a windfall by stripping down the
lien to liquidation value and quickly selling the collateral at fair market
value, thus pocketing equity that would have been completely beyond
reach [of the debtor] save for the fling of the bankruptcy petition."1
Thus, the First Circuit focused on the plain meaning of the statute and
the potential for a debtor windfall.
The next major decision on this topic outside of the Fifth Circuit was
Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Thimble)."2 Unlike Winthrop, this case
concerned an individual debtor in a Chapter 13 cram down and a vehicle
valuation. In Trimble, the debtor, Trimble, purchased a 1988 Ford
Ranger Pickup through secured financing with Metrobank. At the time
of his filing of the Chapter 13 petition, Trimble owed $6,404.84. Under
the proposed plan, Metrobank's secured interest in the truck was valued
at $4,000 with interest, and the remainder was classified as unsecured,
to be paid pro rata without interest. Metrobank argued that it was fully
secured, and for the purposes of a bankruptcy valuation hearing,

26. Id. at 72-73.
27. Id. at 73-74.
28. Id. at 74 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 356 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6312).
29. Id. at 76.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995).
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stipulated with Trimble that the wholesale value of the truck was $4,000
and the retail value was $6,500. The bankruptcy court chose the
wholesale value and the district court affirmed the ruling..
On appeal, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals first examined the two
lines of authority previously discussed. Under theory one, the foreclosure or wholesale value approach, the court summarized its position:
[B]ecause a lien is simply a right to take possession of the collateral
and sell it in satisfaction of an obligation, the value of the lien is equal
to the amount the creditor could receive upon sale of the collateral, or,
in other words, the wholesale value of the collateral.'
In summarizing the other line of authority, the court stated that "'the
value of the creditor's lien is derived from the stream of payments that
the lien secures, rather than the right to foreclose, since no liquidation
of the collateral is contemplated.' 35 The court followed the majority
rule and held that where a debtor proposes to use the collateral, the
retail value, with no costs of repossession or sale deducted, is the proper
method of valuation instead of a wholesale value based on a hypothetical
sale which is not intended to occur. 6 Explaining its reasoning, the
court first found that this interpretation of section 506(a) was the only
interpretation that gave full effect to the second sentence. 7 To
interpret the statute otherwise would result in mere surplusage because
the creditor's interest in the collateral would always be valued at
wholesale value, expressly ignoring the purpose of the valuation, the
proposed disposition, and the intended use of the property.3 Thus, the
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals looked to the plain meaning of the
statute.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals previously decided this issue in
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell).9 In
Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit's bankruptcy appellate panel ("BAP") held
that wholesale values should be applied generally when valuing
vehicles.' The court reasoned that the valuation must be viewed from
the creditor's perspective, and that when viewed from the creditor's
perspective, the creditor's interest is merely the right to repossess the

33. Id. at 530.
34. Id. at 531.
35. Id. (quoting Rash 1, 31 F.3d at 329 (quoting In re Green, 151 B.R. at 504)).
36. Id. at 532.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled by Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96
F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
40. 954 F.2d at 560.
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collateral and resell it at wholesale.4 1 However, after Rash I was
decided and other circuits followed its method of valuing property under
section 506(a), the Ninth Circuit was again confronted with the same
issue in Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi).4"
In Taffi, individual debtors ("the Taffis") filed a voluntary petition for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The IRS, who had a
valid tax lien on the residence of the Taffis, did not object and the court
confirmed the plan. However, how the house was to be valued was still
in dispute. Both parties stipulated values to represent the fair market
value and the wholesale value. The bankruptcy court held that the
foreclosure or wholesale value was the appropriate method of valuing the
property solely as a matter of stare decisis, based on the Ninth Circuit's
prior holding in Mitchell. The United States then appealed to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. The
district court reversed the bankruptcy court and held that the proper
value to be applied was the market value and that this was not to be
affected by any costs of a hypothetical sale.' A divided panel of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court judgment
distinguishing Mitchell because it dealt with the wholesale and retail
valuation of an automobile. With automobiles, both wholesale and retail
are forms of fair market values, whereas a forced sale value of a home
does not represent a fair market value." The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted rehearing en banc.46
On rehearing, the court first looked to the second sentence of section
506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court noted that this sentence
required it to value the property using two factors: "the purpose of the
valuation and the use or disposition to be made of the interest."4 6 The
court found that the purpose of the valuation was not to determine the
amount the creditor would receive if it hypothetically had to foreclose
and sell the collateral, but instead to determine what amount the debtor
should pay the creditor for continued possession and use.4 Because
continued possession means that no foreclosure is intended, the
foreclosure value is not relevant, and therefore, the value must be the

41. I at 560-61.
42. 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 1191.
44. Id. at 1192.
45. Id.
46. Id. The second sentence of section 506(a) provides: "Such value shall be
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use
of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a
plan affecting such creditor's interest." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
47. 96 F.3d at 1192.
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fair market value.' However, the court was quick to note that this
value was not the equivalent of "replacement value" because no house
was being replaced.49 "Fair market value is the price which a willing
seller under no compulsion to sell and a willing buyer under no
compulsion to buy would agree upon after the property has been exposed
to the market for a reasonable time.' 5° Thus, the court focused on the
second sentence's plain meaning and adopted a fair market standard for
valuing property."1
The net result of these three opinions was a majority rule in the
circuits that had addressed the issue. The rule was that under section
506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, property was to be valued at a retail or
fair market value, with the plain meaning of the second sentence of
section 506(a) being the controlling rationale behind these methods.
C. Rash I12
After the first Rash decision had been relied on by other circuits for
two years, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc. The court first
looked to the statutory construction of section 506(a). The court noted
that the first sentence cannot be construed to state only "what" the court
is to value and not "how" to value it." If Congress had intended to
make this indication, it clearly could have done so with "more economy."' Instead, section 506(a) contains a "layered analysis." 6 First,
the court must determine the estate's interest and then the creditor's
interest in the estate's interest. 6 The court noted that determining the
estate's interest is necessary to ascertain whether the property is leased
or, if in the case of real property, the estate's interest is something less
than fee ownership, because something other than fee ownership of any
property would require a different valuation. 7 The determination of
the creditor's interest in the estate's interest is crucial because there is
more than one type of lien. "The creditor's lien may only be a partial

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Note, however, that the court specifically stated that it made no judgment as to how
or whether automobiles should be valued under the "blue book" values. Id. at 1193.
52. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996),
reu'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997). See supra text accompanying notes 2-11 for the factual and
procedural background of this case.
53. 90 F.3d at 1043.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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lien or it may be junior to other liens also secured by the estate's
interest in the property."58 Taking into account the purpose of the
valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the property, the court
ruled that a logical starting point for valuation is the amount the
creditor could realize by selling the property according to the security
agreement because the creditor's interest is that of a security interest."'
Analyzing the second sentence of section 506(a), the court looked to
those same two factors: the purpose of the valuation and the proposed
disposition or use of the property."e The purpose of the valuation in
this case depended on which chapter of the Code the debtor had filed
under (in this case Chapter 13). Because of this, the purpose of the
valuation was to determine the amount of the distribution that ACC
must receive under Rash's plan in order to meet the requirements of
section 1325(a)(5) and get the plan confirmed."1 The court then
suggested that this purpose requires a wholesale valuation because of
the apparent symmetry from the creditor's perspective between
surrendering the collateral or invoking the cram down. 2
However, the court used "boot strapping" to arrive at this conclusion." In considering the proposed disposition or use of the property,
the court rejected ACC's argument that its reading of the code, requiring
a replacement value, gave effect to the second sentence of Section
506(a).64
If the "proposed disposition or use" language in [section) 506(a) merely
tells us to value the collateral in light of the fact that the debtor has
retained possession, that says nothing about whether its worth to the
debtor or its worth to the creditor is the appropriate measure of
value.'

58. Id.
59. Id. at 1044.
60. Id. at 1045.
61. Id. at 1046.
62. Id. at 1047.
63. Id. at 1046-47. The first premise that the court offers as true is that surrender and
cram down are equivalent means of protecting the creditor's interest solely because they
are in fact "structurally" the same, meaning that they are arranged in the statute as
equivalent sub-subsections. Then the court states that the creditor would therefore receive
the same amount from the debtor if he chose to keep the collateral and make payments or
if he surrendered the collateral so that it could be repossessed and sold. The court is using
its first questionable premise to logically leap to its second questionable premise. Finally,
the court concludes from the above that a wholesale valuation is suggested by the Code
itself. Id. at 1046-47.
64. Id. at 1047-48.
65, Id. at 1048.
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Further, the court noted that it cannot be faulted for using a hypothetical value such as wholesale value when replacement value is purely
hypothetical as well." The debtors in a cram down are not going to
dealerships to replace their vehicles. Finally, the court pointed to
language in the second sentence to substantiate its reliance on the
creditor's interest in the first sentence. 7 The second sentence refers to
"[sluch value.'
The use of the word "such" clearly refers back to the
value indicated in the first sentence-the value of the creditor's interest
in the estate's interest.6 9 If replacement value were the appropriate
valuation standard in this case, it would measure a possessory or
ownership interest of the creditor which the creditor does not have. The
creditor has a security interest, and therefore deserves an amount
equivalent to what it would receive under a security agreement. 70
The court next addressed the economic relationship arguments
propounded by the creditor, ACC. ACC first contended that when
debtors keep the collateral they realize that it has more value than
foreclosure or wholesale value because it would otherwise be surrendered. Therefore, a replacement or retail value more closely reflects the
economic reality of the situation.7 ' In response, the court noted that
"when hypothetically purchasing a replacement for the collateral from
a retail dealer, the debtor would be buying... services provided by a
dealer, such as inventory storage, reconditioning, marketing, and
warranties of quality."72 If a secured creditor was to receive more of
the distribution of proceeds than other creditors simply because of his
security interest, unless he is a retailer himself he should not profit from
the addition of valuable services rendered by others.73
The dissent suggested that a successful reorganization produces a
surplus because the debtor is allowed to keep the collateral while the
creditor benefits from the income stream of payments and the avoidance
of resale and foreclosure costs.74 Because there is a surplus, secured
creditors are due this amount in the form of replacement value because
it is their lien that is creating this surplus.75 In rejecting this argument, the majority stated that the payments made to the creditors are
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 1048.49.
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
90 F.3d at 1049.
I&
Id. at 1051.
I&
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1066 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id
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from the debtor's production of income and the debtor's decision to opt
for the cram down.76 Therefore, it is "perverse to argue that the
secured creditor's claim should be inflated by the 'financial surplus'
created in significant part by the debtor's post-confirmation labor."77
The dissent also suggested that the collateral is worth more in a
reorganization such as this one because of the collateral's going-concern
value.7" As defined by the majority, going-concern value "'indicates the
market value of an ongoing business as a whole and thereby includes an
additional element of value that attaches to property considered in the
aggregate, by reason of the property having been assembled for the
conduct of the business."'" This definition appears to be perfectly
suited for the facts of this case because Rash bought the truck at issue
for the express purpose of using it in his freight-hauling business.w
However, the majority pointed out that going-concern valuation has
typically been an issue only in business reorganizations under Chapter
11 and is not generally applicable in Chapter 13 contexts. 81 Perhaps
even more importantly, when the collateral is in the form of a commercial vehicle, it is almost always purchased for and necessary to
conducting a business.
ACC next argued that using a wholesale valuation would generally
allow debtors to reap a windfall when they retain their truck and then
sell it at a higher price.82 The court stated that this is a weak argument when one compares the size of the creditor to the size of the
debtor.' "It stretches credulity to suggest that ACC, with all of the
financial resources, personnel, and foreclosure sales experience at its
disposal, could not sell the truck for a price at least equal to what the
Rashes could receive for it."" Therefore, the potential for a windfall
using the wholesale or foreclosure value approach, if any, rests with the
creditors in the form of a "cram down premium," and should not result
merely because of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.8'

76. Id. at 1053 n.21.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1062 (Smith, J.,
79.

dissenting).

Id. at 1053 n.23 (quoting Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re

Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 56 B.R. 339, 386 (Bankr. D. Minn, 1985), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 850 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1988)).
80. Id. at 1039.
81.

Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1054.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
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Turning to legislative history, the court first noted that courts will
have to determine value on a case-by-case basis."6 The court then
pointed to a House Report from the first session of 1978 which pointed
to a wholesale approach to valuation:
Current Chapter XIII does little to recognize the differences between
the true value of the goods and their value as leverage. Proposed
chapter 13 instead views the secured creditor-debtor relationship as a
financial relationship, and not one where extraneous, non-financial
pressures should enter. The bill requires the court to value the secured
creditor's interest. To the extent of the value of the security interest,
he is treated as having a secured claim ......
Thus, the court concluded that the statute intended to set the amount
of the claim at the value of the security interest so that creditors would
not receive, and debtors would not pay, more than what the creditor
would receive in a repossession and sale."
After viewing the legislative history of the statute and other provisions
of the code, the court held that Chapter 13 valuations of a secured
creditor's interest under section 506(a) should start with what the
creditor would receive pursuant to his state-law remedy under the
security agreement itself: repossession and sale."9 Thus, the court
reversed itself and created a circuit split on the issue of valuation.
However, it is important to note that the court restricted its holding in
this decision and merely suggested wholesale value as a starting point
for the valuation. But given the language in the opinion about the
difference in replacement or retail value and wholesale or foreclosure
value simply being the add-ons at the dealership, it is hard to see any
distinction between this starting point and the final valuation except in
cases where the creditor is itself the retailer of the goods in question.'
D.

Hoskins and Valenti
On December 12, 1996, yet another method for valuing a secured
creditor's interest in property was enunciated when the Seventh Circuit
decided In re Hoskins. 1 In this case, the bankruptcy court had simply
valued a secured creditor's claim on a vehicle using the midpoint of the

86. Id. at 1055-56. See S.REP. No. 989, at 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5854.
87. 90 F.3d at 1056. See H.R. REP. No. 595,124 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6085.

88. 90 F.3d at 1056.
89. Id. at 1061.
90. See id. at 1052 n.20.
91. 102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996).
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wholesale and retail values. The district court affirmed and the secured
creditor appealed. 2 The en banc opinion, written by Chief Judge
Posner, first explored the difference between wholesale and retail
prices." The court noted that retail value is usually wholesale value
plus the costs of selling at retail, which are avoided at repossession and
sale."
The court next discussed the economic problem of "bilateral monopoly.' According to the court, "bilateral monopoly" refers to a situation
where two persons can bargain over some thing of value only between
themselves, and neither can rely on competition." For example, a
plaintiff in a damages action can only negotiate with the defendant and
the defendant can only negotiate with the plaintiff. In analyzing the
costs and benefits of the bankruptcy proceeding on the creditor, the court
first noted that but for the bankruptcy proceeding, the creditor, NBD
Bank, would only have been entitled to repossession and sale. 7
Therefore, because it is not in the business of retailing cars, NBD was
only entitled to the car's wholesale value.9 At the same time, depriving the debtors of their car would be depriving them of a necessity that
would either force hardships in travelling to work or in purchasing
another car. Either alternative weakens the windfall argument because
the debtors would not surrender a perfectly good car in order to undergo
hardship or to purchase another one at full retail price." Further,
because an individual cannot give warranties and perform marketing
like a retailer, it will not achieve a retail price."° According to the
court, the debtors would not agree to purchase another car for the same
price as retail value and the creditor would not agree to refinance for
less than wholesale value.' 01 Thus, any price between these two
valuations is a win-win situation for both parties." °
Because there is no way to predict where in the bargaining range the
deal would hypothetically be struck, most parties use a midpoint or

92. Id. at 311, 316.

93. I& at 312-13.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Who would buy a car from an individual at the same price as from a dealer
when a dealer could at least give some kind of meaningful warranty and possibly free
services?
101. Id. at 316.
102. Id.
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"focal point" which is defined as a natural point where parties often end
up in bargaining without significant puffery." a Therefore, the court
held that in Chapter 13 cases involving automobiles and similar assets
used to produce income for the debtor, the secured creditor's interest is
valued at the average of the retail and wholesale values.'" The court
was quick to point out that a bilateral monopoly problem could easily
surface in the valuation of sentimental assets as well, such as a personal
residence.'0 5 In either situation, the court reasoned that this result
would avoid windfalls and discrimination amongst creditors.'" The
secured creditor who is not a retailer cannot recover more than he would
have been able to but for bankruptcy at the unsecured creditor's
expense, and the unsecured creditor is given the chance to at least
recover some portion of its loans.0"
In a vigorous concurrence," ° Judge Easterbrook discussed the need
for a legal rule of decision and for uniformity throughout the Code.'"
Because the Code does not supply a standard for valuation, Judge
Easterbrook pointed to state law. "When the non-bankruptcy entitlement is the power to sell at auction (or in another commercially
reasonable way), then the secured portion of a claim is the net price the
chattel would fetch at such a sale-in a word, wholesale."" Further,
Congress could have created a special rule for bankruptcies under
Chapter 13 in automobile credit situations like it did for home loans;
because it did not, it must have intended to reiterate the normal
approach to valuing Article 9 property in a cram down-wholesale value.
The Second Circuit next addressed this issue in General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti)." In Valenti, the bankruptcy court valued the debtors' automobile at the average of the retail and
wholesale value, and this ruling was upheld by the district court. The
secured creditor, General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC"),
appealed arguing for a retail price valuation." 2

103. Id.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 317.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Judge Easterbrook reasoned that a wholesale value approach should be used and
yet concurred with the judgment because the trustee representing the interests of the
unsecured creditors did not take a cross-appeal. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 318-20 (Easterbrook, J., concuring).
110. Id. at 318.
111. 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 58-59.
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In analyzing section 506(a), the court adhered to the common reading
of that provision. The court found that the first sentence requires that
Thus,
the creditor's interest in the debtors' interest be valued."
under a plain reading of the statute, because the debtors owned their
automobile in this case, the creditor's interest in the debtors' interest
requires that GMAC's right to repossess and sell the Valentis' car be
valued." 4 In determining this value, a bankruptcy court must consider both the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use
of the property under the plan as suggested by the second sentence of
section 506(a)."' The court first found that the purpose of the valuation in this case was to identify the "allowed amount" of GMAC's
The court then turned to the dispositive question of the
claim."
proposed disposition and use of the property, and its effect on the value.
First, the court disagreed with the rationale behind the retail
approach: the debtor would have to pay this price to replace the
vehicle."' The court stated that "[tihis ignores the possibility that the
debtor could replace the vehicle at a cost below retail by purchasing
another car as is from a non-dealer.""' The retail price includes not
only a vehicle's costs, but also dealer add-ons such as reconditioning,
profit, warranty, and sales commissions. This would be the same as
reaffirming the original debt." At the same time, wholesale value is
not per se correct because "the value of the creditor's allowed claim must
account for the likely replacement cost of the Valentis' vehicle.""2
Therefore, the court held that no one rule of valuation is necessary so
long as the requirements of section 506(a) are satisfied by considering
both (1) the purpose of the valuation and (2) the proposed disposition or
use of the property.12 The court reasoned that this holding was
required by the legislative history of section 506(a) which mandated a
standard of flexibility and determination of value on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the facts, interests, and circumstances of each
case.122
Hoskins and Valenti thus created a third approach to the valuation of
claims under Section 506(a) and specifically in the Chapter 13 context.

113. Id. at 59.
114. Id. at 60.
115. Id. at 59.

116. Id. at 61.
117. Id. at 62.
118. Id
119. 1d

120. Id at 61.
121. I at 62-63.
122. Id. at 62.
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With three different methods of valuing property in the circuits, and
other circuits yet to consider the issue, this issue was ripe for settlement
by the United States Supreme Court.
III. THE SUPREME COURT-RASH III
On June 16, 1997, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Ginsburg, resolved the split in the circuits on the issue of which
method of valuation is to be used in the context of Chapter 13 cram
downs."2 The Court first noted that when it speaks of "replacement
value," it does not mean the definition that the court in Taffi used.
Instead, it defines "replacement value" as "the price a willing buyer in
the debtor's trade, business, or situation would pay a willing seller to
obtain property of like age and condition."2 4
The Court then turned to the Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion (RashID.
The Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's reading of section 506(a)
that the first sentence was dispositive in instructing courts to begin by
looking to the wholesale value. 2 ' The first sentence, according to the
Court, recognizes that courts may encounter difficult valuation situations
where the estate's interest may differ, such as in leased property, or
where the creditor's interest may differ, such as in junior liens. 2 '
Therefore, the Court held that the first full sentence of section 506(a),
"in short, tells a court what it must evaluate, but it does not say more;
it is not enlightening on how to value collateral."" 7
But the Court did find that the second sentence, particularly the
"proposed disposition or use" language, was enlightening as to how to
value collateral." 2 The "disposition or use" of the property turns on
whatever alternative the debtor chooses: surrender or retention and use
by the debtor (cram down)."m The Court noted that when the property
is surrendered, it is then subsequently sold and the proceeds can
immediately be reinvested. 30 However, if the property is kept and put
to use, creditors cannot quickly sell it to recover the proceeds and then
reinvest them for their own benefit. The creditor is instead exposed to
double risks: further deterioration of the property and the high

123. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997) (Rash II. For the
factual and procedural background of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 2-11.
124. Id. at 1884 n.2.
125. Id. at 1884.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130,

Id. at 1885.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX5XB), (C) (1994).
117 S. Ct. at 1885.
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likelihood of another future default."3 ' The actual "use"-the election
to use the collateral to generate an income stream-should therefore be
the appropriate guide rather than a hypothetical sale of property. 3"
Further, if the correct method of valuation were to be wholesale or
foreclosure value, then it would attribute no significance to the different
consequences on the creditor of the debtor's choice to surrender or retain
and use the property.' 3 This seems especially so when surrender
would lead to the recovery of a wholesale or foreclosure price, but
retention of the property to generate income, while exposing the creditor
to extra risks, would fetch only the same amount. Thus, the Court
expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit's structural premise that surrender
and retention are equivalent from the creditor's perspective.'" With
regard to the Fifth Circuit's argument that a replacement or retail
valuation would be in derogation of state law because creditors could get
more in bankruptcy than under their state-law rights, the Court stated
that a replacement valuation "no more disrupts state law to make
'disposition or use' the guide for valuation than to authorize the
rearrangement of rights the cram down power entails."3 5
In addressing the Seventh and Second Circuits, Hoskins and Valenti,
respectively, the Court agreed that a legal rule of valuation is needed to
ensure uniformity throughout the circuits. 1"
However, the Court
concluded that section 506(a) "supplies a governing instruction less
complex than the Seventh Circuit's 'make two valuations, then split the
difference' formulation." 37 Therefore, the Court held that under
section 506(a), the value of property retained under the Chapter 13 cram
down option is the cost the debtor would pay to obtain a like asset for
the same proposed use-replacement value.'-"
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that a foreclosure value was more
appropriate." 9 Justice Stevens first argued that the first sentence of
section 506(a) does reveal how to value collateral: collateral should be
valued in the creditor's hands on the open market."4 In the hands of
a creditor, who is often not a retailer, this value would be that of a
foreclosure or wholesale value. Second, Justice Stevens correctly points

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id at 1886.
Id. at 1885.
Id. See Rash 11, 90 F.3d at 1046.
Rash III, 117 S. Ct. at 1886.
Id.
Id
Id. See supra text accompanying note 124.
117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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out that the majority opinion ignored the "purpose of the valuation"
language of the second sentence of section 506(a). 4 According to
Justice Stevens, the purpose is to put the creditor in the "same shoes"
as if he were able to exercise his state law rights and foreclose on the
truck.'42 Justice Stevens also pointed to the need for uniformity not
only throughout the circuits, but also throughout the Code itself, as
reason for a foreclosure value standard.'" Perhaps Justice Stevens's
best argument in support of the adoption of a wholesale or foreclosure
standard was originally argued by the National Association of Consumer
Bankruptcy Attorneys, Inc. in its amicus curiae brief.'" Justice
Stevens argued that the risk of further deterioration of the collateral
does not necessarily jeopardize the creditor's secured claim.'
If the
creditor detects that the property is depreciating faster than the stream
of payments under the plan are being received, then it may move for an
order requiring adequate protection or for relief from the automatic
1
stay.

In short, the Court held that a replacement value standard was the
appropriate method of valuation in Chapter 13 cram down cases.
However, the opinion gave little guidance about how to properly
determine what "replacement value" was.
IV

THE PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
OPINION IN RASH

The part of the opinion which has caused the most controversy is in
footnote six. Footnote six reads as follows:
Our recognition that the replacement-value standard, not the foreclosure-value standard, governs in cram down cases leaves to bankruptcy
courts, as triers of facts, identification of the best way of ascertaining
replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether
replacement value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or
some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the nature of the
property. We note, however, that replacement value, in this context,
should not include certain items. For example, where the proper

141. Id.
142. 1d
143. Id. This seems especially persuasive where the best interests rule of section
1325(a)(4) requires that unsecured creditors only be given at least the equivalent of a
liquidation or foreclosure value. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX4) (Supp. 1997).
144. Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys,
Inc. in support of Respondents at 7, Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 1997 WL
145010, (5th Cir. 1997) (No. 96454).
145. 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
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measure of the replacement value of a vehicle is its retail value, an
adjustment to that value may be necessary: A creditor should not
receive portions of the retail price, if any, that reflect the value of items
the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehicle, items such as
warranties, inventory storage, and reconditioning .... Nor should the
creditor gain from modifications to the property-e.g., the addition of
accessories to a vehicle-to which a creditor's lien would not extend
under state law.14
This footnote clearly raises many questions. What appeared to be a
bright-line rule has instead become a facts-and-circumstances test. The
footnote clearly states that "replacement value" can be retail value,
wholesale value, or any other method of valuation appropriate under the
circumstances of the case.s Our only guidance from the Court
requires that the method chosen be determined by weighing two factors:
the type of debtor and the nature of the property. However, the Court
does not identify the different types of debtors. Does the chapter of the
Code the debtor files under determine what type he or she is, or are all
This question
debtors either business or non-business debtors?
necessarily requires inquiry into whether this case applies outside of
Chapter 13 cram down cases because a business debtor is precluded from
filing a petition for relief under Chapter 13. The second factor requires
that we look to the nature of the property. "Nature" could mean that it
is used for leisure activities as opposed to transportation, residential or
commercial, mechanical or nonmechanical, good or bad, and so on. Thus,
the opinion gives no real guidance about what "replacement value" really
means.
The footnote does list some items to be left out of the valuation process
when it has been determined that replacement value requires a retail
approach, such as accessories added by the debtor, reconditioning,
warranties, and inventory storage. 4 9 However, this list is woefully
inadequate. There are many other add-ons to a car's sticker price such
as advertising and marketing, sales commissions, overhead, transportation fees, delivery fees, and security. This will require massive
discovery. It is quite simple to deduct these expenses where the retailer
has only one car on the lot. But where the inventory constantly
fluctuates, the proceeds are reinvested to finance the purchases of other
vehicles from the manufacturer, and the record-keeping process varies
from dealer to dealer, the discovery process becomes much more tedious.
For example, what is the cost of reconditioning a whole car lot over a

147. Rash III, 117 S. Ct. at 1886-87 n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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period of time divided by the number of cars? What about insurance?
What about security? What about overhead? What about the total cost
of advertising divided by the number of cars sold, and how do you trace
the sale to one particular ad? What is the average cost of all cars sold
within a period with warranties versus cars sold without warranties?
And what is the average commission paid to salespersons divided by the
number of cars they sold?"W Because the costs and headaches of such
discovery are enormous, sides will likely settle quickly and favorably to
creditors or a battle of the experts will result requiring both sides to find
the most persuasive testimony.'
The opinion also does not address how to conduct a wholesale
valuation where it is the appropriate method to find "replacement
value." Because the wholesale/auction market is open to consumers for
the replacement of vehicles or other property, there needs to be discovery
on the average market prices paid for similar property in a similar
condition at resale after repossession. 5 2 Further, many consumers
purchase vehicles from one another in different ways, most notably by
classified advertising. Therefore, it would be prudent to expend some
discovery resources on this market to ascertain the average prices that
consumers pay for similar property in similar condition.
Another issue not addressed by the Court is whether this decision was
limited to vehicles. It could be argued that this opinion is limited to
vehicles because the very footnote that so adequately explained
"replacement value" in general terms refers to vehicle valuation by
listing items of value not to be included in a retail valuation that usually
are present in retail vehicle sales and by expressly stating the word
"vehicle."" However, the Court's opinion cites Winthrop as authority
for the retail method of valuation and that case dealt with a Chapter 11
business debtor and a nursery constructed on real property.'
Further, the footnote itself refers generally to the type of debtor and the
nature of the property as being outcome determinative, a generic
standard. Both support the argument that the Court was merely using
vehicle valuation as an example in the footnote.
Outside of footnote six, there are general questions left unanswered by
the court. How does this opinion apply, if at all, to non-cram down

150. See Gary Klein, Esq., Supreme Court Forum: OpinionRaisesMore QuestionsThan
It Answers, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 1997, at 18.
151. See Robert F. Mitech, Esq. & Carleton B. Crutchfield, Esq., Supreme CourtForum:
The Rash Decision: A Question of Value in Context, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 1997,
at 18.
152. Klein, supra note 150, at 19.
153. Rash II, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.6.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
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valuations? If the debtor chooses to retain the property in a Chapter 13
reorganization, are the hypothetical costs of sale to be deducted all of the
time, none of the time, or in cases where "replacement value" equals
"wholesale value"? Does this opinion apply to Chapter 11 and 12
reorganizations? Finally, how does this interpretation of section 506(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code, a universal provision applicable to all Chapters,
apply in other reorganizations and contexts? For example, in a section
722 redemption, the double risks of default are negated and therefore
replacement value is probably inappropriate.'" All of these questions
are left unanswered and will produce certain confusion and debate.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court opinion in Rash supposedly answered the question
of what valuation method to apply in the Chapter 13 cram down context.
The replacement value is the appropriate method to use in valuing a
secured creditor's interest in the property.'" But, as discussed above,
the opinion actually raises more questions than it answers and will
likely lead to increased litigation over how to value property instead of
what method to use. Further, because the opinion stated in footnote
six"5 7 that the use of wholesale or retail valuation may be dependent
upon the circumstances, the bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts are
still left with the task of applying this new rule of law to the particular
facts, interests, and circumstances of each case. The only question that
the Supreme Court's Rash opinion answered was that there is no per se
rule of valuation.
In order to propose an adequate solution to this problem, I would like
to address each of the problems mentioned in the section above. First,
in determining which method of valuation to use for "replacement value,"
the Court completely undermines its own rationale. For example, the
Court specifically stated that the actual retention and use of the
property through the cram down power in order to generate an income
stream should govern how to value property instead of a hypothetical
sale. i" Further, the Court stated that if a wholesale value was used,
it would afford no consequence to the choice of retention of the property.'59 To then say that replacement value could sometimes mean
wholesale value where the debtor retains the property by use of the cram

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Mitch, supra note 151, at 19.
Rash III, 117 S. Ct. at 1886.
Id. at 1886 n.6.
Id. at 1886.
Id. at 1885.
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down power is just as spurious and still attributes no consequence to the
choice of retention.
It is clear that the type of debtor is completely irrelevant where the
debtor chooses to keep collateral and generate an income stream because
if the debtor is in bankruptcy, the risk of default is equally present for
businesses and individuals. The real guide should be the type of
retained property and what the retained property will be used for. If the
secured property is to be used to generate an income stream, such as a
vehicle, tractor, or a tool for use in the debtor's business, then it should
be valued at retail because the debtor would have to replace it in order
to be financially successful in the reorganization period. For example,
a trucker would be less likely to successfully make all of his payments
without his truck. But if the secured property were an off-road
motorcycle, the trucker's immediate financial success will not usually
hinge on his replacement of the dirt bike. A wholesale value would be
more appropriate because no income stream is likely to be generated
from the use of this asset. Note that this proposed solution also takes
into account other issues. In terms of real property, if the property is a
primary place of business operations for a Chapter 11 business debtor
or an individual's primary residence, then it is vital to immediate
financial success, such as making payments when due under a confirmed
plan. As such, it would otherwise have to be replaced and should be
valued at retail or fair market value. If, however, the property is not
vital to the business's financial success or it is not a primary residence
of an individual debtor, then it should be valued at foreclosure or
wholesale price.
Likewise, the particular reorganization chapter the debtor files under
should not matter because the type of retained property and the
intended use for the property divide property into two categories:
property that is used to generate income and property that is not used
to generate income. Thus, this test should also not be applicable in noncram down valuations. If the debtor decides not to retain the vehicle
and a valuation is otherwise needed in a proceeding, a wholesale value
should be used because, as the Court stated in the opinion, a replacement value affords significance to the choice of retention or surrender of
an asset."6 If there really is no choice, then there should be no
competition between methods of valuation.
Some might argue that hypothetical costs of sale should be deducted
where a wholesale value is used if the property is being retained. If an
asset is valued at wholesale, it must be remembered that any wholesale
price is a net price in the hands of the debtor, because the debtor will
160. Id.
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most certainly have to expend some effort or incur some cost in
procuring a sale. However, there are arguments that suggest that no
hypothetical costs of sale should be deducted. First, no sale is going to
take place in a cram down because the debtor has expressly rejected the
surrender option and chosen to retain the collateral. Second, there are
many ways to sell an asset below retail or fair market value with hardly
any effort because a wise consumer may recognize a bargain and act
quickly upon any effort by the creditor to sell the property. I, however,
believe that economic reality dictates that the hypothetical costs of sale
not only be deducted where the replacement value is a wholesale price,
but also where a retail price is the replacement value. As the Rashes
argued in their brief to the court,161 to determine what the value of a
piece of property is, the person making the determination must at least
consider what price could be had for the property in its market, be it
wholesale or retail.16 For example, the value of a home is at least
partially determined by reference to what homes in similar neighborhoods and floor plans are selling for in the market. Therefore, every
valuation necessarily hypothesizes some form of a sale, and every sale
involves at least some effort or cost expended by the seller in procuring
a buyer. It may be argued that some valuable property has no value in
a market, and therefore a sale cannot be hypothesized. But for any
creditor to lend money and be willing to take a security interest in a
good, that good must usually be a member of a recognizable market.
Otherwise, the creditor would be exposing itself to an incredible financial
risk in the case of a default because the property would essentially be
worthless outside of the hands of the debtor. In this instance, it might
be a better financial decision to let the debtor keep the property than to
spend even more resources on repossessing worthless goods.
Finally, this interpretation of section 506(a) of the Code should apply
for uniformity purposes. Replacement value should be the standard, but
it should be determined by looking at either retail/fair market value or
wholesale/foreclosure value depending on the type of property and the
proposed use of the property. For example, in a Chapter 7 liquidation,
the property is to be liquidated and the debtor would not intend to keep
the property or use it to generate an income stream. A wholesale value
should be used to determine the asset's replacement value.
Determining how to value property is much more difficult than
determining which method or test to apply because of the different costs

161. Brief of Respondent at 17-18, Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 1997
WL205707 (5th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-454).
162. David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Standardsin Chapter13 Bankruptcy
Cases, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 18 (1996).
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associated with different types of property. There is simply no quick and
easy solution to this part of the opinion. While a "blue book" might be
beneficial for vehicle valuations, there are two problems associated with
using a published guide. First, other types of property may not be
associated with an industry standard publication for pricing. Second,
some of these published guides are published by parties that have the
potential to benefit from its circulation." Therefore, the courts will
be forced to resort to case-by-case determinations of wholesale, retail,
foreclosure, and fair market value.
MARK

E. BEArry

163. For example, the NADA guide is published by the National Automobile Dealers
of America. Such an organization's members have the potential to benefit from the prices
that the guide publishes either at the time of sale or trade-in, or later in a bankruptcy
valuation.

